The essential elements for violation of Anti-Bouncing Check law [BP 22] are: issuance of any check; knowledge of the maker that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds; and dishonor of the check. The prosecution has to prove them beyond reasonable doubt. Failure to do so will necessarily result in exoneration.
Knowledge of the insufficiency of funds involves a state of mind of the person issuing the check, which is difficult to prove. To solve the issue, the law created a prima facie presumption of such knowledge under
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22. It reads: Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. – The making, drawing and issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the bank because of insufficient funds in or credit, when presented within 90 days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie proof of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds unless such maker pays the holder the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within five banking days, after receiving notice that such check has not been paid. To get this legal presumption, the prosecution must prove the following: check is presented within 90-day period from the date of the check; issuer of the check personally receives a notice that such check has not been paid; and he fails to pay or to make arrangements with the check-holder for full payment within five banking days from receipt thereof. The prima facie evidence cannot arise, if such notice of non-payment by the drawee bank or check-holder is not sent to or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the check-issuer, since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial five-day period. To reiterate, the check-holder must send a letter that the check-issuer must personally receive.
There was a case where the check-issuer was successively convicted thrice to be only reversed by our Honorable Supreme Court because of the violation of a constitutional right and misapplication of the law. This is the case of Dico v. Court of Appeals & People, G.R. No.141669, February 28, 2005. In 1993, three checks issued by Jaime to Equitable Card bounced. A demand letter dated June 8, 1993 was sent. In 1994, three counts for violation of bouncing check law [B.P. 22] were filed. He denied the charges on arraignment. The parties waived the pre-trial. At the trial, the prosecution presented one witness proving the dishonor of the three checks. The first check dated January 15, 1993 and second check dated May 12, 1993 were both deposited on May 17, 1993. However, the second check’s number as indicated in the Information is 364903 while the one offered as proof is 369403. The third check dated June 12, 1993 was deposited on June 14, 1993. Accused admitted issuing the checks, but contested the credit card billing of P1,035,589.29 as his credit limit is only P499,000. The reconciliation of account was refused and so with his offer to pay by four post-dated checks: P100,000 for May, P200,000 for June, P300,000 for July and P300,000 for August.
The Metropolitan Trial Court convicted Jaime to suffer six months’ imprisonment for each three checks and ordered to pay their face value [totaling P600,000.00]. He appealed, but the Regional Trial Court denied it. He appealed and the Court of Appeals acquitted him in the first check dated January 15,1993 since it was presented for payment on May 17, 1993 – beyond ninety days – and thus no such prima facie proof of knowledge of insufficiency of funds exists. However, his two convictions on the two checks were affirmed. He appealed the three successive convictions.
Our Honorable Supreme Court ruled that when an accused appeals a decision, he throws open the whole case for review and it becomes its duty to correct any error even if was not raised before. The second check’s number in the Information is 364903 while the number offered as proof is 369403. The variance in the identity of the check affects the first element of B.P. 22 and violated the accused’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged against him. The third check dated June 12, 1993 was deposited on June 14, 1993, but the demand letter was made on June 8, 1993 – when the check is not yet due. This is not the notice that the law requires. Thus, the rulings of the CA, RTC and MeTC were reversed and Jaime was acquitted but required to pay the second check at P200,000 with 12% interest per annum.
