One who issues rubber check is criminally and civilly liable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 provided the following is proven [1] the check was issued to apply for account or for value; [2] knowledge of the accused that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds; and [3] the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit or for having been drawn against a closed account [Campos v. People, 735 SCRA 373]. To prosper, the accused must personally receive the notice of dishonor [demand letter] as a way to prove the second element [Dela Cruz v. People, GR 163494, 03 August 2016]. In B.P. 22 [Anti-Bouncing Check] cases, the civil action is deemed instituted [filed] with the criminal action and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed. While one may be acquitted for issuing a rubber check, yet he is still held civilly liable. When is accused in B.P. 22 not civilly liable? When a bouncing check produce the effect of payment was ruled by our Supreme Court in the case of Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc., G.R. No. 211564 [20 Nov. 2017].
In 1991, Screenex, Inc. lent Evangelista P1,500,000 As security and payment, he gave two [2] open-dated checks. From the time of issue, the checks were held in safe keeping until they were deposited and a demand was made in 2004. In 2005, Evangelista was charged with violation of B.P. 22. The MeTC [Metropolitan Trial Court] ruled the prosecution proved the first two elements, but not the third element – the accused had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued – since the demand letter was not actually received. While he was acquitted of the criminal charge, yet he was still held civilly liable. On appeal, the issue of prescription [that the right to collect ceased to exist due to lapse of time] was raised for the first time. The RTC [Regional Trial Court] denied the appeal because the 10-year prescriptive period of the action under Article 1144 of the New Civil Code is computed from the time the right of action accrues – that is in 2004 when the demand was made and the criminal case was filed in 2005. On appeal, the CA [Court of Appeals] affirmed the RTC.
The case reached the Supreme Court. It ruled that under Section 119 [d] of the Negotiable Instrument Law, a negotiable instrument like a check may be discharged by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money.
Applying the law, a check is a contract subject to prescription of actions. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that actions upon a written contract must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues. Section 17[c] of the NIL provides that an undated check is presumed dated as of the date of its issuance. Based on law, the action based on a check is reckoned from the date indicated on the check, but if the check is undated, the action is reckoned from the date of its issuance. It is a settled rule that the creditor’s possession of the debt instrument is proof that the debt has not been discharged by payment. It is also a rule that a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money. Its delivery does not, by itself, operate as payment. But, payment is deemed effected and the obligation for which the check was given is treated discharged, if 10 years or more has elapsed from the date indicated on the check or from its issuance if undated until the date of encashment or presentment for payment.
The failure to encash the checks within a reasonable time after issue, or more than 10 years, not only results in the checks becoming stale but also in the obligation to pay being deemed fulfilled by operation of law. Thus, Article 1249 of the Civil Code provides that checks must be presented for payment within reasonable period after their issuance and delivery thereof shall produce the effect of payment xxx when through the fault of the creditor they have been impaired.
This rule is similarly stated in NIL’s Section 186 – what time a check must be presented – check must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its issue or the drawer will be discharged from liability. While it is true that the delivery of a check produces the effect of payment only when it is cashed, pursuant to Article 1249 of the Civil Code, the rule is otherwise if the debtor is prejudiced by creditor’s unreasonable delay in presentment of the check. It was also held that if no presentment is made at all, the drawer cannot be held liable irrespective of loss or injury. The delivery of the checks, despite the subsequent failure to encash them within a period of 10 years or more, had the effect of payment. The action has prescribed and Evangelista is considered discharged from his obligation to pay the checks.
