In criminal prosecution, an accused is presumed innocent. As such, government prosecutors have the duty to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.
This includes all the elements of the crime, the allegations of the Information and identity of the accused as the one who committed the crime. The defense only need to prove a single doubt that accused is not guilty.
However, alibi and denial of the accused are the weakest of all defenses. On the other hand, the trial court should see to it that the constitutional rights of the accused are respected.
One of the constitutional rights of the accused is the right not to be a witness against himself. This is the right against self-incrimination. One case that reached our Honorable Supreme Court was the conviction of one accused for rape with homicide of a 12-year old minor based on his written extrajudicial confession in the presence of a lawyer. The case is People v. Agustin with G.R. No. 247718 dated 03 March 2021.
Agustin was charged with rape with homicide of a 12-year old girl. Five witnesses testified: [1] doctor, who examined the body, found injuries on the genitalia, body and neck, with asphyxia by strangulation as cause of death; [2] lawyer invited by the police to assist the accused, who was insistent in admitting the crime despite informing him of his right to remain silent and signed a written confession in question and answer form; [3] victim’s mother, [4] barangay captain and [5] police officer, who prepared the confession, were stipulated that they know the parties.
On the other hand, accused denied the charge and his confession. After trial, the RTC [Regional Trial Court] convicted Agustin ruling the requirements for admission of written extrajudicial confession were complied. The CA [Court of Appeal] affirmed his conviction and found the [1] confession consistent with the medical findings, [2] no coercion on the accused and [3] retraction was a flimsy excuse to extricate himself. Agustin appealed to the Supreme Court questioning the admissibility of his extrajudicial confession. Is that confession enough to convict?
The nexus that connects Agustin to the rape-slay perpetrated against AAA was his extrajudicial confession. The remaining evidence is sorely insufficient. Our Constitution’s Article III, Section 17 provides that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Section 12 provides that any person under investigation for the commission of a crime shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of Sections 12 and 17 shall be inadmissible as proof. The right to be informed of one’s constitutional rights during an investigation refers to an effective communication between police and suspect, with the purpose of making the latter understand these rights.
The law does not merely require the police to “inform” the investigated person; rather, it requires that the latter be “informed.” The lawyer, was not the choice of the accused, but of the police, who did not inform him that he can waive his rights. This resulted in the violation of his constitutional right to have a competent and independent lawyer. The extrajudicial confession did not comply with Section 2, par. D of R.A. No. 7438 requiring the presence and signature of counsel or in his absence, upon a valid waiver and in the presence of any of the parents, elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession is inadmissible as proof in any proceeding. Such violation makes the RTC erroneous to use it in convicting Agustin. No presumption of constitutionality may be given to extrajudicial confession until the prosecution convincingly establishes the regularity of its taking and its compliance with the Constitution. Although the defense of denial interposed by Agustin is weak, this fact alone would not warrant his conviction. The burden is on the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on him to prove his innocence. Well-entrenched is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest, not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the prosecution. The death of 12-year old is tragic, but we must uphold the primary of the presumption of innocence when the required proof for conviction falls short.
