A true relationship based on pure love always ends in marriage.
As a proof of one’s unselfish and undying love, the man will promise to marry the woman he loves. On the other hand, the woman is willing to wait to get that promise from the man she honestly loves.
But sometimes, love has its own heartache, especially when a relationship is not really based on love, but something else. If the purpose of marriage is other than love, the relationship will not last and is doomed to fail.
Now, is there a liability if one breaks the promise to marry? Is sorrow caused by broken hearts actionable?
Our Supreme Court tackled the issue in the 2021 Guevarra v. Banach case [G.R. 214016] involving a German citizen [Banach] who sued a Filipina [Guevarra] for backing out on the marriage.
Their relationship started when they met through a Pastor. He courted her almost every day, giving her gifts. Later, he told her that he is a divorcee, but in reality he is still living with his third wife.
She accepted the offer of marriage and was given P500,000 to buy a lot for their conjugal home. Later, she broke up upon learning the truth.
Banach sued alleging that Guevarra had repeatedly expressed her love and willingness to marry him so that he would send her money, only to break up with him after he had done so. He claimed that these acts amounted to fraud. She argued that the money sent was a gift, the return of which is not actionable.
The Regional Trial Court ruled for Banach. Guevarra appealed, but lost in the Court of Appeals, as she was ordered to return the money under the principle of unjust enrichment [no one shall unjustly enrich herself at the expense of another]. Guevarra appealed and the Supreme Court ruled that under our laws, a breach of promise to marry is not actionable.
The New Civil Code omitted the provisions in the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 that allowed actions for breach of promise to marry. Thus, such breach is no longer recognized as an actionable wrong to discourage litigation that had once been abused. This policy asserts that our civil courts are not the proper venues to adjudicate interpersonal matters.
Beyond this public policy, however, is the recognition that the right to marry is a fundamental human right. The choice of whether to marry and, necessarily, whom to marry, is a personal decision that a person makes for oneself. This individual choice must be made completely free from any external pressures. Choosing a person to marry is intimately connected to a person’s autonomy.
Any State interest in the institution of marriage must not lead to an unjustified intrusion into one’s individual autonomy and human dignity. It is not within the courts’ competence to reach too far into intimate relations. Courts, through litigation, should not dictate on or even pressure a person into accepting a life of marriage with a person he or she rejects. Courts must, as much as possible, refrain from meddling in these personal affairs.
An individual has the autonomy to choose whom to marry, or whether to marry at all. He or she must be free to make that choice without any fear of legal retribution or liability.
The decision on whether to marry is one that should be freely chosen, without the pressures of a possible civil suit, should a person realize that his intended partner is not right for him. For this reason, litigation to the sorrows caused by a broken heart and a broken promise must be discouraged.
A mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, as long as it is not of such extent as would palpably and unjustifiably contradict good customs. As there is no provision in the new Civil Code allowing a suit for breach of promise to marry, the act of backing out from marriage is not actionable.
The exception is when the act is not a mere breach of promise to marry, but constitutes one where damages may be recovered under Article 21 which says that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
The law was applied in the 1964 Wassmer v. Velez, case where it was ruled that ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it barely two days before the wedding is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promisor must be held answerable in damages.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219 (10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.
