Under the Family Code, the obligation to support is imposed mutually upon the spouses [Article 68]. This means that both the husband and wife have the obligation to give support to each other.
With the passage of R.A. 9262 in 2004, some legal minds weaponize its two provisions in the marital disputes: Section 5 [i]causing mental, emotional anguish or humiliation to the woman or her child because of verbal/emotional abuse and denial of financial support [with penalty of 6 to 12 years’ imprisonment] and Section 5 [e] [2] attempting to compel the woman or child to engage in conduct which they have the right to do or attempting to restrict freedom of movement or conduct, including deprivation of financial support or deliberately providing them insufficient financial support [with 6 months to 6 years’ imprisonment].
In applying the two VAWC provisions, it has been held that charge for Section 5 [i] necessarily includes a charge of Section 5 [e]. As such, the denial of financial support by itself punished under Section 5 [i] is also sufficient to support a conviction for violation of Section 5 [e].
The variance doctrine is the basis for such a ruling, which happens when the charge is different from what was proven. It allows a trial court to convict one even if the presented evidence failed to prove the crime alleged in the Information, but the evidence proved another similar crime. Thus, in the 2019 case of Reyes vs. People [G.R. 232678, 3 July 3 2019], accused was charged of Section 5[i] but convicted of Section 5[e] while in the 2018 Melgar vs. People [G.R. 223477, 14 February 2018] accused was convicted of VAWC under Section 5[e] by itself even without the element of psychological violence.
In 2021, another criminal VAWC case for mere failure to give support was raised again and decided by our Supreme Court en banc [with 14 justices concurring with J. Caguioa] in Acharon v. People, G.R. No. 224946 [09 Nov. 2021]. In this case, the Information alleged that the husband caused mental, emotional anguish and public ridicule or humiliation to his wife by denying financial support.
At the trial, the wife testified they were sweethearts for six years before they married. Six days after, husband left to work at Brunei Pizza Hut as delivery driver. As placement fee, they borrowed P85,000 from their “ninang”. The husband would send P9,633 a month to pay the loan. As husband did not send money regularly, she felt embarrassed since he was only able to pay P71,500, leaving a balance of P13,500. She found out that her husband has a paramour thru photographs sent by friends, which caused her mental anguish. The husband denied all the accusations since his sending of support only stopped because of a fire that razed his rented house and a vehicular accident, which required expenses.
The RTC convicted the husband for having a paramour while in Brunei and his neglect of his obligation to support. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC that refusal to give financial support constitutes violence against women and his failure to give support and pay the loan constitutes economic abuse.
On appeal, our Honorable Supreme Court stressed that Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 uses the phrase denial of financial support, which is defined as “refusal to satisfy a request. This is different from “failure,” defined as not doing something that should be done. The crimes penalized under Sections 5(i) and 5(e) of R.A. 9262 are mala in se, which means wrong by itself, even though R.A. 9262 is a special penal law [as distinguished from mala prohibita, which is wrong because there is a law punishing it]. There must be proof of both overt act or omission and intent or guilty state of mind. It is not enough for woman to experience emotional anguish or her partner to deny financial support. For criminal liability to arise under Section 5(i) R.A. 9262, insofar as it deals with denial of financial support, there must be proof that the accused willfully withheld financial support to inflict emotional anguish upon her. For convicting the husband due to his paramour, the RTC violated the accused’s right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him because having a paramour was not alleged in the Information and thus cannot be proven. It also abandoned the Melgar and Reyes cases insofar as they hold that a person charged with violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 may be convicted of violating Section 5(e) by applying the variance doctrine. The two provisions punished different things. While both deal with denial of support may seem similar at first glance, they, in reality, deal with different matters and penalize distinct acts. Thus, our Supreme Court comes to the realization that mere failure or inability to provide financial support is not punishable by R.A. 9262.
